Assessing the equity and effectiveness of the GB energy price caps using smart meter data by Hardy, A et al.
Assessing the Equity and Effectiveness of the GB Energy Price Caps using Smart
meter Data
A. Hardya, D. Glew, C. Gorse
aLeeds Beckett University, Leeds, LS2 9EN
Abstract
Keeping homes at a comfortable temperature and reducing household fuel bills are priorities for many governments.
In the UK, several interventions have been implemented to achieve these objectives. This paper investigates one such
policy lever - the Energy Price Cap - to understand if it has been designed and implemented efficiently and equitably.
The price cap was introduced for customers on prepayment meters to combat increased levels of fuel poverty and a lack
of competition in this group. However, the price cap was based on several assumptions of how energy is used. In this
work, we assess how well the price cap accounts for real energy use using smart meter data. Households on economy 7
(EC7) tariffs were found to spend more than those on standard rate tariffs, as EC7 customers use more electricity during
peak hours than assumed in government calculations. Additionally, many of the EC7 customers in this sample still use
a considerable amount of gas, suggesting the EC7 heating product is either not sufficient, or is not being utilised in a
cost-effective manner. Revisions to the input assumptions in government models for EC7 customers would therefore be
beneficial in future price cap levels.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Domestic heating and health
When a home is not kept sufficiently warm, occupants
are at increased risk of several health problems. For ex-
ample, cold homes have been linked to increased risk of
anxiety and depression [1, 2], and the increased presence
of mould can cause respiratory problems [3]. The simple
solution to these health issues is to heat homes to a suffi-
cient level. In the UK, Public Health England recommends
a minimum temperature of 18◦C to avoid the health issues
associated with cold homes [4] and UK homes are, on av-
erage, heated to this temperature [5]. However, studies
have also revealed significant variability in internal tem-
peratures. A survey of 1,600 low-income households in
the UK measured daytime winter indoor temperatures to
be between 13.0◦C and 21.8◦C within the 5th to 95th per-
centile range [6]. A substantial number of homes in the
UK are therefore not kept sufficiently warm, and the ef-
fects of these cold homes can be seen in national statistics.
The UK Office of National Statistics suggests that there
is a regular 20% spike in the mortality rate in winter, a
quarter of which can be directly linked to homes being
too cold [7]. Other research has suggested that UK death
rates rise between 0.9% and 2.8% for every degree Celsius
drop in the outdoor temperature[8]. The prevalence of cold
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homes in the UK means that, cumulatively, they cost the
National Health Service (NHS) an estimated £1.36 billion
each year [9]. Under-heating of UK homes therefore has
major implications for both citizens and the government.
There is no single reason that UK homes are under-
heated, but a contributory factor is often low income.
Households on a low-income have been reported as ra-
tioning fuel use to avoid high fuel bills and getting into
debt [10]. Additionally, the UK building stock includes
many properties with low energy efficiency, as over 80%
of UK homes were built prior to the first building energy
efficiency regulations[11]. Heating these older properties
can therefore prove expensive even for those on higher in-
comes. Finally, high fuel prices can deter consumers from
using a sufficient amount of energy to heat their homes.
Fuel prices have increased faster than inflation in recent
years [12], and many customers find themselves on expen-
sive fuel tariffs which can further deter any expenditure
on heat.
1.2. Housing Energy Policy
The UK government has introduced several measures
to combat the trilemma of low household incomes, excess
dwelling heat loss, and high fuel prices. For households
on low-incomes, the Warm Home Discount Scheme, Cold
Weather Payments and Winter Fuel Payments have been
established to help pay for the energy required to heat
their homes. To tackle the inefficiency of the UK housing
stock, there has been substantial investment in improving
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the efficiency of homes. New-build houses now have to ad-
here to increasingly strict regulations designed to ensure
high energy efficiency [13]. Existing houses can also receive
financial support to improve their homes via schemes such
as the energy company obligation (ECO)[14]. Finally, to
address the issue of high fuel prices, the regulator for the
electricity and gas markets in GB (ofgem) have histori-
cally provided guidance to customers on how to engage
with the energy market and obtain a cheap price for en-
ergy. However, despite the existence of such guidance, en-
gagement with the energy market has remained low. For
example, consumers have reported a mistrust of energy
companies and a fear of “getting a worse deal” [15], while
other customers are unaware that switching tariffs is even
possible[16].
1.3. Equity, overpayment and switching
Due to the small number of customers engaging in the
energy market, it is estimated that many households are
overpaying on their energy bills; in 2016, it was found
that UK customers overpaid a total of £1.4 billion when
compared to the cheapest available deals [16]. Many of
these customers are overpaying as consequence of how the
UK energy market operates; UK customers sign up to a
fixed rate contract and, upon expiry, are automatically
moved onto the more expensive standard variable-rate tar-
iff (SVT). Market-conscious customers may search for a
new contract or switch supplier, but switching rates are
low and up to 66% of customers lapse onto the expensive
SVT[17].
Households from certain demographic groups are less
likely to switch from their expensive SVTs than others.
The competition market authority (CMA) report that peo-
ple with low incomes, who are living in rented accommo-
dation or who are above 65 are more likely to be on SVTs
[16]. The fact that those with a low-income are more likely
to be on an expensive SVT is a troubling association, as
it is these low-income households that could benefit the
most from cheaper energy deals. Switching rates are also
lower among those who use prepayment meters [16]. Pre-
payment meters operate on a “pay as you go” basis, with
customers paying for energy before they use it. The CMA
reports that the low level of switching amongst prepay-
ment customers is partly due to the higher rate of the
previously mentioned characteristics (low-income, living in
rented accommodation etc.) found in prepayment meter
customers. In addition, those on prepayment meters would
require a new energy meter if they want to take advantage
of cheaper direct-debit tariffs, adding an extra barrier to
switching. Prepayment customers also tend to be offered
worse deals that those who pay by other methods with the
result that any prepayment customers who do switch from
their SVT tend to save much less.
1.4. The Price Cap
To tackle the issue of prepayment customers overpaying
for their energy, ofgem imposed a price cap on prepayment
SVTs in April 2017. The price cap does not cap total
energy bills, but instead defines the maximum amount that
can legally be charged per unit of energy. The prices are set
based on a CMA benchmark, which calculated the typical
detriment (or overspend) of prepayment customers when
compared to a competitive deal [16]. These numbers are
then adjusted every 6 months to account for changes in
the wholesale price of energy, inflation and environmental
levy forecasts.
The price cap was initially applied to the 4 million pre-
payment meter customers in GB but, as of February 2018,
the cap has also been applied to the 1 million customers
who receive the warm-homes discount. The cap is designed
to give these customers a better deal for their energy, al-
low customers to heat their homes to a more comfortable
level and lessen levels of fuel poverty. However, when cal-
culating the potential savings caused by the price cap, a
typical domestic consumption for a household in GB was
assumed. The effect of the price cap on those who do not
conform to this assumption has not been studied. This pa-
per uses smart meter data to calculate what the fuel bills
of customers would be under price cap conditions, and test
if the assumptions are valid. Of particular interest is the
way the legislation treats those on prepayment economy 7
(EC7) tariffs. EC7 tariffs are different from standard rate
tariffs, in that they receive cheaper electricity for 7 off-peak
hours, but have to pay a premium for peak electricity use.
EC7 (and the similar economy 10) tariffs where originally
designed for customers who use a product such as storage
heating, and therefore can ensure high off-peak electricity
use. However, the premium charged for peak electricity on
an EC7 tariff means that they can be considerably more
expensive if used incorrectly. The price-cap legislation as-
sumes that prepayment EC7 customers use 42% of their
electricity during the off-peak period. However, the legisla-
tion does not make any concessions around the sensitivity
of the policy outcome if this assumption is violated. In
this work, we use energy-use profiles of real homes to de-
termine what typical fuel use and fuel bills would be for
different demographics, including the EC7 customers, to
evaluate the success of the policy regarding its equity and
efficiency.
2. Data Analysis
2.1. Gas and Electricity Use
Determining the effect of the energy price cap requires
a knowledge of how different demographics tend to use
their heating systems. The Energy Demand Research Project
(EDRP) gathered data which traced utility usage for 18,370
households in the England and Scotland[18]. Energy use
was recorded using smart meters every thirty minutes for
an average monitoring duration of 631 days. Additional
data were also collected describing household’s geographic
location (Local Distribution Zone and Grid supply point)
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and electricity tariff type (standard or EC7). Each house-
hold was also placed in a demographic group, described by
the Acorn system [19](see Table 1).
Four energy companies were involved in the recruit-
ment of participants for the EDRP: EDF, Eon, Scottish
Power and SSE. The sampling strategy varied between
companies, but in all cases a degree of stratification was in-
volved. EDF stratified by estimated annual consumption,
meter type and demographic information. Eon stratified
their sample according to a four-fold categorisation of “fuel
poor”, “not fuel poor”, “high use dual fuel customers” (de-
fined as those consuming more than 7,000 kWh of electric-
ity per year) and EC7 customers. Scottish power stratified
by the energy use of its customers. SSE straitified their
sample by fuel mix (electricity only or dual fuel) and de-
mographic. EDF is the only company which recruited EC7
customers, and the EDF sampling strategy required that
EC7 customers in their sample also use an EC7 heating
product such as storage heaters. The publicly available
EDRP data were downloaded from the UK data archive
[20]. Several households were missing from the available
data, resulting in data from 14,621 being downloaded. Ad-
ditionally, houses with missing demographic or geographic
information were removed, along with houses whose mon-
itoring duration was less than 365 days, as at least a full
year’s worth of data is required to capture the total annual
fuel bill and allow comparison with other properties.
In houses which fulfilled the above criteria, there re-
mained instances where data were missing. In these cases,
the following procedure was followed to fill-in these miss-
ing data. First, all time-series were cut to one year’s worth
of data and missing time steps were padded with NA val-
ues to ensure all time series were of the same length. If
entire days’ worth of data were missing, an attempt was
made to fill these missing days with data of an equivalent
date from a different year. If this was not possible, a me-
dian profile of winter and summer use was generated for
each household, and this median profile was used to fill
in the missing day. An analysis of any remaining missing
data was then conducted. It was then noted that some
smart meters were consistently missing data from partic-
ular hours of the day. If these missing data fell within a
peak-use period, the time-series would be biased to lower
total energy uses. A check for these consistent dropouts
was therefore conducted, and any time series which was
missing more than 5% of the data from a particular hour
was removed.
After these steps had been conducted, some time se-
ries maintained a small number of randomly distributed
missing values. These values were tolerated, providing the
amount of missing data did not exceed 5% of all data. The
resulting database contained data for 11,878 households.
The median annual electricity use for each Acorn group
was then calculated and is displayed in figure 1, with un-
certainties calculated using a bootstrap procedure. The
electricity use is split depending on if the customers use
a standard or an EC7 meter. Most Acorn groups show
significantly higher electricity use among the EC7 cus-
tomers, as would be expected when EC7 heating products
are used. In those groups which do not show a signifi-
cant difference, the reason may be due to a smaller sample
size. For example, Acorn group P only contained 13 EC7
customers which contributes to its wide error bar. Ofgem
publishes “Typical Domestic Consumption Values” (TD-
CVs) that describe annual electricity and gas use for typi-
cal customers [21]. At the time the smart meter data were
taken, the TDCV of a median-use customer was 3300 kWh
for standard rate customers, and 5000 kWh for EC7 cus-
tomers. The average electricity use of the EC7 customers
is somewhat lower than the TDCV for most demographics,
suggesting that many EC7 households in this sample use
less electricity than is typical.
The average annual gas use for homes with a gas me-
ter installed is displayed in figure 2. Again, the gas use is
split depending on if the customers use a standard or an
EC7 meter for their electricity. It might be expected that
customers with an EC7 product would use significantly
less gas than those without. However, this is not the case,
and some EC7 customers are still using considerable gas.
In these homes it is likely that, although an EC7 heating
product is installed, it is being supplemented by consid-
erable gas heating. Again, many of the customers in this
sample appear to use less gas than suggested by ofgems’
TDCV, as an annual use of 16,500 kWh was considered as
median gas use [21].
2.2. Fuel Bills
Energy tariffs typically consist of a fixed amount charged
per day (the standing charge), and cost associated with
one unit of energy (the unit rate). The standing charges
and unit rates of prepayment SVTs were obtained directly
from the “Big 6” energy suppliers (British Gas, EDF, Eon,
NPower, Scottish Power and SSE). These prices were all
consistent with the April 2018 price cap conditions. The
Big 6 energy companies supplied energy to ∼80% of UK
customers in the third quarter of 2017 [22] and these tariffs
are therefore broadly representative of what prepayment
meter customers are likely to pay. It was noted that the
standard tariffs offered by the big 6 companies tend to
group around the maximum values allowed within the cap
(see table 2), and little variation therefore exists within
these prices.
Like the standard tariffs, the standing charges for the
capped EC7 tariffs also group around the maximum al-
lowed value. However, the unit rate in EC7 tariffs show
more variation than the standard rate tariffs due to the
way in which EC7 tariffs are handled within the legisla-
tion. Rather than define a maximum amount that can be
charged during both the peak and off-peak periods, en-
ergy suppliers are permitted to choose any rate provided
the total price for 4,600 kWh of electricity does not exceed
a fixed amount, assuming a split of 42% off-peak use, and
58% peak use. A energy company can therefore charge























Figure 1: Median electricity use for each Acorn group. The majority of groups show greater electricity use for their economy 7 customers, as




















Figure 2: Median gas use for dwellings with a gas supply. Despite using economy 7 products, the economy 7 customers often do not show
significantly lower gas use than standard tariffs. economy 7 customers may therefore still be relying on gas heating systems.
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Table 1: Acorn Groups
Group Description Average Income (£) Sample Size
A Lavish Lifestyles 74021.4 1250
B Executive Wealth 61981.7 2089
C Mature Money 44118.1 1008
D City Sophisticates 54954.4 194
F Countryside Communities 38338.2 172
G Successful Suburbs 44307.9 673
H Steady Neighbourhoods 39820.0 1129
I Comfortable Seniors 27946.0 663
J Starting Out 39731.5 713
K Student Life 28854.6 551
L Modest Means 30070.5 639
M Striving Families 27416.2 1261
N Poorer Pensioners 16932.4 776
O Young Hardship 26112.8 352
P Struggling Estates 23673.1 269
Table 2: Tariff information for Single Rate Electricity under the April
2018 price cap for the East Midlands
Company Standing Charge Unit rate
Maximum allowed 30.42 14.09




Scottish Power 30.41 14.09
SSE 30.41 14.08
they offset this with a lower charge for the off-peak pe-
riod. This variation is demonstrated in Figure 3, which
shows the EC7 prepayment SVTs for a house in the East
of England.
The price-cap tariffs offered by the big-6 energy com-
panies were used to calculate a typical annual fuel bill for
each household in the sample (see Fig. 4). Some of the
houses in the sample had no gas data, but it was not known
if this was due to the house being electricity-only, or due
to a lack of a gas smart meter. For the purpose of price
calculation, only properties with both electricity and gas
smart meters were therefore included. Uncertainties were
calculated using a bootstrap method. For EC7 tariffs, the
lower-rate period was assumed to be 12pm to 7am. The
start and end times for the EC7 tariffs are at the discre-
tion of the energy company and information on this exact
period is not freely available for all tariffs. However, the
low-rate period is unlikely to vary considerably from the
assumed period.
The price-cap legislation was designed to bring pre-
payment fuel bills down so that they are more competi-
tive with a reference “benchmark” deal. For a median-use
household, this benchmark bill was £775 per year [16]. For
many of the lower-income acorn groups (M-P) on standard
rate electricity, the average fuel bill does indeed appear
to be within this range. This is not the case for EC7
customers as in many demographics, the EC7 customers
show higher fuel bills than those on standard tariffs. This
is likely, in part, due to their apparently high gas use de-
spite the owning of EC7 heating products. In addition, the
amount of electricity used during the off-peak hours (be-
tween 12 and 7 am) was noted to be low. Cost-effective
use of EC7 tariffs relies on shifting as much electricity use
as possible to the off-peak period. As displayed in Fig.
5, many EC7 customers in this sample use around 75% of
their electricity during the day. This amount of daytime
use is similar to those on standard rate tariffs, and sug-
gests many customers on EC7 tariffs would be better off
switching to a standard tariff.
The fuel price legislation assumes electricity use is split
at 42% night use, and 58% day use. As most EC7 cus-
tomers use more electricity during the day, the majority
will also spend more on 4,600 kWh of electricity than is
allowed by the price cap. To determine how much more,
the cost of 4,600 kWh of electricity was calculated for each
EC7 customer and for each of the big 6 energy company’s
tariffs. The results are displayed in Figure 6, with the
red horizontal line denoting the maximum amount cus-
tomers should be charged under the price cap legislation.
The different rates charged by the energy companies for
peak and off-peak use has a noticeable effect on how much
EC7 customers spend. Customers who are able to reduce
their daytime electricity use to below 58% will find them-
selves rewarded most with an Npower tariff. However, if
their electricity use strays above the 58% split, the same
Npower tariff will penalise customers to a greater degree
than other tariffs.
2.3. Fuel Poverty
The increased fuel bills experienced by EC7 customers


















Figure 3: Comparison of the electricity unit costs of economy 7 tariffs
for the “big 6” energy companies. The price-cap only limits the
amount that can be charged for 4,600 kWh of electricity, assuming
a 42% off-peak use, and 58% peak use. Companies can therefore
charge higher rates for peak electricity use if they offset this with
low charges for off-peak use.
(FP). Assessing whether or not a household would be in
FP requires knowledge of the household income. This in-
formation was not made available in the EDRP dataset,
and an accurate assessment of FP is therefore not possi-
ble. However, average income information is associated
with each Acorn demographic, and this income allows an
approximate risk of FP to be assessed (see Table 1). The
UK government adopts a Low-Income High-Cost (LIHC)
definition of FP. In the LIHC definition, a household is
classified as fuel poor if it’s required energy cost is high
(greater than the median), and if its disposable income,
after spending on fuel, would put it below the poverty line
[23]. To determine if the households in this work might be
in FP, any houses whose fuel cost exceeded the UK me-
dian were first extracted [24]. Houses which fulfilled this
criteria were then assigned an approximate income based
on their demographic and their disposable income, after
spending on fuel, was calculated. The poverty line is de-
fined as 60% of the national median disposable income [25]
and any households who additionally fulfilled this criteria
were classed as being at risk of FP.
In the sample as a whole, there was no significant dif-
ference between FP probability for EC7 and standard tar-
iffs. Many demographics show no risk of FP at all due
largely to their high income. However, assuming average
acorn salaries, FP was found to occur in Acorn groups I,
K, M, N and P. Furthermore, a significant difference in
FP probability was found between standard rate and EC7
customers in group N: poorer pensioners. In group N, the
percentage of EC7 customers (n=107) in FP was found
to be 50+9−10%, whilst the percentage of standard rate cus-
tomers (n=364) in FP was found to be 34±5%. Pensioners
are typically associated with greater levels of occupancy
during the day than other demographics, which would be
associated with additional heating demand during this pe-
riod. The increased incidence of FP risk for EC7 customers
may therefore be due to their relatively high electricity use
during peak hours compared to other demographics.
3. Discussion
The analysis in the previous section assumes that the
consumption of each household was such that a comfort-
able and safe level of warmth was achieved. However, it is
likely that many of the households in this study adjusted
their utility consumption based on their income and the
actual tariff they were on. Low-income households may
then use less energy than required to maintain a comfort-
able and safe internal temperature. Indeed, a general neg-
ative trend seems to exist between acorn income and the
fuel use displayed in Figures 1 and 2. Furthermore, Acorn
group P displayed median gas use well below the TDCV,
suggesting that under-heating may be occurring frequently
within this group. Any reduced consumption would have
the result that a lower than typical fuel bill would have
been calculated, and these houses could therefore be over-
looked in the definition of FP. The FP risk presented in
Section 2.2 should therefore be considered only a lower es-
timate. To avoid issues of under-heating affecting govern-
ment statistics, the UK government rely on modelled util-
ity use assuming a safe internal temperature is always ob-
tained. However, these modelled consumption values are
also associated with many uncertainties and limitations,
as they generalise building types and heating schedules.
Whilst the smart meter data used in this study cannot ac-
curately determine levels of FP, it can capture real heating
patterns and unusual features which are not captured by
standardised heating profiles.
Another potential limitation of using the EDRP smart
meter data as a metric for typical energy consumption is
that the smart meters installed in the EDRP were an inter-
vention which may have reduced typical consumption[18].
The smart meter data may therefore be biased to lower
values than is typical in a household. The EDRP reports
that utility use was indeed reduced by approximately 3% in
their smart meter trials. However, the EDRP data ceased
being recorded in 2010 and between 2010 and 2016, tem-
perature corrected domestic energy consumption in the
UK also fell by ∼ 5%[26]. This was partially due to the
increased use of energy efficiency measures such as loft in-
sulation. Current consumption of UK homes is therefore
likely to be slightly below that reported in the EDRP, but
this difference is not likely to be much more than 2%.
4. Conclusion and Policy Implications
Energy price caps have historically proven themselves
to be difficult to implement[27] and often draw criticism
for their effect of stifling competition and reducing innova-
tion [28]. It is certainly the case that for the GB prepay-
























Figure 4: Median annual fuel spend if all dwelling were subject to the April 2018 price cap. economy 7 customers often pay noticeably more
than standard customers.
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Figure 5: Proportion of electricity used during the peak (daytime)
hours for both economy 7 (EC7) and standard customers. The
dashed line shows where the peak in economy 7 use should be ac-
cording to the economy 7 fuel cap legislation. Very few economy 7
customers use electricity in the percentage assumed in the price cap,
and the majority of economy 7 customers use electricity in similar
proportions to standard rate customers.
the cap which suggests a lack of competition (see Table
2). However, proponents of price caps will highlight these
customers were unlikely to engage with the market in the
first place[16], and the lack of competition may not have a
considerable detriment on these customers. Furthermore,
even a capped non-competitive prepayment market was
expected to cause savings of hundreds of pounds for many
customers who were previously on uncapped tariffs[29].
This study suggests that the energy price cap will have
been successful in reducing energy bills to the level ex-
pected for many customers in low income demographics.
If all customers in the study were subject to the energy
price cap, the annual fuel bills of many customers would
be equal to or below the benchmark deal used as a ba-
sis for the legislation. However, customers on EC7 tariffs
have significantly higher annual fuel bills in most demo-
graphics and would therefore not recieve as much benefit
from the price cap. The result that EC7 customers tend
to spend more under price cap conditions is concerning, as
EC7 heating systems have been associated with increased
levels of FP - 48% of households in Scotland with storage
heaters were found to be fuel poor, compared to 31% of
households that use mains gas[30]. Price caps also raise
a potential issue for vulnerable customers who do engage
in the energy market. Imposing a cap on certain tariffs
may cause energy suppliers to raise prices on other tar-
iffs to compensate [31]. Any vulnerable customers who do
engage with the energy market may then find the cheap
deals that were previously available to them have been re-
moved. The potential ethical issues surrounding price caps
are outside the scope of this work, but are a factor which
could be considered when designing future legislation.
Under normal market conditions, it is common for a
house which utilises storage heaters and EC7 to spend
more than a house which uses gas. Indeed, ofgem have
shown that a 3-bedroom house would have cost £1478 in
2015 to heat with storage heaters on an EC7 tariff and
£1064 for a gas fired boiler[30]. However, the EC7 price
caps were designed with this discrepancy in mind, and
aimed to address this difference with more favourable EC7
prices. The failure to fully address this issue in our sam-
ple is, in part, because the price cap does not account
for the the high use of peak electricity displayed by most
EC7 customers. Addressing the issue could therefore be
achieved by assuming higher peak energy use in the price
cap legislation. The EC7 customers themselves could also
shelve some of the blame for the higher prices as they are
not using their heating system in a cost-effective manner.
This may be due to confusing heating controls, a misunder-
standing of the costs involved or a genearl lack of engage-
ment. Another way to handle the misuse of EC7 heating
systems would therefore be to address the houses with EC7
heating systems directly. This could be in the form of guid-
ance to customers to ensure they know how to use their
system correctly, and maintenance to ensure the heating
system is operating as expected. A more extreme solution
could be to remove the storage heaters entirely and install
either gas heating or a low-carbon alternative such as heat
pumps. Heat pumps would be particularly useful for prop-
erties that have no gas supply, and would also be in line
with the UKs drive to decarbonise heat. Storage heating
systems are found disproportionately in private-rented and
social housing compared to other sectors[30], and schemes
to remove EC7 systems could therefore target landlords,
housing associations and local authorities.
The potential failure of the price cap for EC7 customers
stems from assumptions around how households use energy
not being met. EC7 tariffs are becoming less common, and
a gradual reduction in EC7 customers might be expected
over time. However, there are an increasing number of
time-of-use (ToU) tariffs being offered. Like EC7 tariffs,
ToU tariffs utilise multiple electricity rates depending on
the time of day, with peak electricity being the most ex-
pensive. A report commissioned by ofgem suggests that
the majority of customers would change their electricity
consumption in response to a ToU tariff and therefore re-
ceive lower fuel bills [32]. However, if the assumptions on
electricity consumption patterns in this report also prove
to be incorrect, then ToU customers could also find them-
selves with high fuel bills. Given the lack of engagement
in the UK energy market [16], ToU tariff customers in
this situation may not realise they are overspending and
may not switch back to a standard rate tariff. ToU tar-
iffs should therefore be introduced with caution, especially
within vulnerable demographics, and all assumptions on
expected consumption behvaiors should undergo rigorous
testing. A potential solution to lapsing and unsuitable
ToU tariffs could be to force ToU tariffs which expire onto
a standard rate SVT rather than a ToU SVT. If imple-




















Figure 6: Amount that each economy 7 tariff house would spend on 4600 kWh of electricity with the “big 6” energy companies in the GB
under the October 2017 price cap. The horizontal red line denotes the maximum price as stipulated in the price cap, and was calculated
assuming economy 7 customers use 58% of their electricity during the peak period. The majority of houses clearly use more electricity during
the peak period than assumed by the price-cap and would therefore pay more than the maximum allowed.
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benefited many of the EC7 customers in this study, as they
behave like standard rate electricity users likely without
realising.
Prepayment meter customers (and subsequently, warm
home discount customers) were initially targeted with the
energy price cap because these groups were identified as
being at risk of FP[16]. At the time of writing, plans to
extend this energy price cap to all SVTs were under way
to further protect customers. Despite the initial targeting,
these blanket price caps remain a blunt tool that affects
different customers to different degrees. Bespoke target-
ing of vulnerable customers would likely be more equi-
table, but such bespoke identification has previously been
a challenge. As suggested in this study, smart meter data
may allow more specific identification of vulnerability to be
achieved and therefore may allow for more targeted policy.
For example, customers in Acorn Group N (Poorer pen-
sioners) and with EC7 heating were identified as having
the highest FP risk in this work. With additional infor-
mation such as accurate income data, even more specific
identification of vulnerability could likely be achieved. In
this case, the need for blanket price caps could be removed
altogether.
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